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    Introduction    
 
  In recent years the United States Southwest 
Border has had a tremendous increase in drug smuggling 
from Mexico to the United States. Various federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies have stepped 
up their efforts to combat this increased influx of 
narcotics into the United States.  The Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), United States Customs, and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are the 
lead agencies combating the drug trade.  
The purpose of this professional paper is to take 
a look into the U.S. federal law enforcement responses 
to the increased narcotics smuggling on the two 
thousand mile long Southwest Border.   
  Another important subject that will be touched 
upon is the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).  The agreement which was made with Mexico and 
Canada has opened up the borders to a wealth of 
legitimate trade, but at the same time has caused a 
major increase in the amount of drugs that pass into 
the United States. 
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  The involvement of the US Military in drug 
trafficking along the border will also be discussed at 
length.  Since the introduction of the military, much 
controversy has arisen to their use in civilian law 
enforcement. 
  Following this discussion will be a final 
analysis of the facts and the conclusion reached by 
the supporting facts. 
Literature Review 
History 
I chose the topic of drug enforcement because 
drugs have been a part of American society since 
Chinese immigrants became the first known drug 
smugglers of opium in the 1870’s (Drug Enforcement 
Agency, 1999).  This topic was also chosen because 
there is very little academic research available that 
focuses on law enforcement and how exactly drug issues 
are dealt with  at the front lines of the border.  
There has been many nonacademic articles on how US law 
enforcement is making a dent in the drug trade and how 
our officers are helping to staunch the flow of drugs 
into the United States.  At the same time there are 
many documents and reports that show law enforcement 
is losing the battle against narcotic traffickers and 
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have not made a difference in the amount of drugs that 
enter the United States. 
Taking full advantage of the 2,000-mile border 
between Mexico and the United States along with the 
massive flow of legitimate trade and traffic, well-
entrenched polydrug-trafficking organizations based in 
Mexico have built vast criminal empires that produce 
illicit drugs, smuggle hundreds of tons of South 
American cocaine, and operate drug distribution 
networks reaching well into the continental United 
States (DEA, 1999).            
Mexico is the principal transit route for South 
American cocaine, a major source of marijuana and 
heroin, as well as a major supplier of methamphetamine 
to the illicit drug market in the US. The drug trade 
and other criminal activities generate huge cash 
proceeds, given the intimate ties between the two 
countries' financial systems, and the absence of 
adequate controls in the Mexican system.  Mexico has 
become a major money laundering center and the 
preferred international placement point for US 
dollars.  Drug cartels launder the proceeds of crime 
in legitimate businesses in both the US and Mexico, 
favoring transportation and other industries, which 
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can be used to facilitate drug, cash, and arms 
smuggling, or to further money laundering activities 
(U.S. Department of State, 1997).  The power of these 
Mexican drug trafficking organizations makes stopping 
the flow of drugs a very difficult task. 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
estimates Mexico traffics 70% of all drugs entering 
the United States.  For instance, commercial trucks 
were allowed to pass freely from Mexico and Canada 
without unloading their cargo for US border inspection 
as of December 18, 1995 (US Customs, 1997).  Although 
this particular schedule has been indefinitely 
postponed, commercial trucks are usually “waved” 
through the borders and typically do not undergo any 
inspection do to the numerous amounts of trucks.  This 
relaxed standard eases drug smuggling.  Taking into 
consideration the fact that 927,736 commercial trucks 
passed through Texas alone in 1996, it is obvious that 
the potential of smuggling drugs to the United States 
is very high. 
         According to the General Accounting Office of 
the United States “Operation Alliance”, which took 
place in 1996, showed that the primary smuggling route 
across the southwest border was by land.  This report 
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pointed out that although cocaine was the primary drug 
threat, followed by marijuana, the heroin threat was 
growing.  This report stated that in spite of law 
enforcement agencies efforts to counter drug 
smuggling, the flow of drugs between the ports of 
entry along the Southwest border continued to flourish 
due to the vast open areas and relatively low law 
enforcement presence.  This report concluded that “our 
successes are insignificant when compared to the 
threat.” (GAO, 1997).  According to the GAO, “Our 
collective efforts are only a minor irritant to the 
drug smugglers.”  This study, which was conducted 
under the name “Sandia”, dubbed the Texas and Arizona 
border areas “cocaine alley” due to the large 
shipments of drugs that pass into the United States 
through these areas undetected (Government Accounting 
office, 1997). 
DRUG POLICY FAILURES 
  According to the National Drug Policy Congress 
oversight committee of 1996, drug law enforcement has 
been de-prioritized.  The congress over sight 
committee found many shifts in policy from the Reagan 
and Bush administrations to the now present Clinton 
administration.  Congress showed that indicators of 
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federal support for the counter narcotics effort on 
the drug war, particularly drug interdiction, show a 
substantial reduction in resources committed to key 
areas.   
In early 1995 key budget numbers were already 
clearly below the prior high water marks deemed 
necessary for an effective strategy (National Drug 
Control Policy, 1996).  The 1994 and 1995 Clinton 
administration’s Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) strategies represent two conscious 
shifts in policy, one toward greater drug treatment 
emphasis within the demand reduction component of the 
strategy and one toward greater source country program 
emphasis within the supply reduction component.  The 
oversight committee also cited that according to their 
research, drugs are coming through the Southwest 
border at an unbelievable rate and law enforcement is 
overwhelmed (National Drug Control Policy, 1996). 
Another disturbing fact is that the price of 
street narcotics is lower than ever and the potency of 
those same drugs, particularly heroin and crack, are 
higher.  The nations interdiction effort along the 
Southwest border has been dramatically curtailed over 
the past three years due to lack of White House 
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support for interdiction needs, reduced funding, a 
tiny staff at the U.S. Interdiction Coordination 
Office, the absence of an ONDCP Deputy for supply 
reduction, reduced support for National Guard 
container search days, the elimination of certain cost 
effective assets in the eastern Caribbean, as well as 
the Southwest border, reassignment or absence of key 
intelligence gathering assets, reluctance by the 
Department of State to elevate counter narcotics to a 
top priority in certain source and transit countries, 
unnecessary interagency quarreling over asset 
management and personal issues, and the apparent 
inability or unwillingness of the White House Drug 
Czar to bring essential interdiction community 
concerns to the attention of the President or to aid 
the President’s Interdiction Coordinator in doing so 
(National Drug Control Policy, 1996).  
Narcotics Interdiction used to be the first 
priority of the National Security Agency, now 
currently it is the twenty ninth priority of the 
United States.  During 1994 and 1995, White House Drug 
strategies represented a conscious shift of resources 
away from border interdiction or transit zone counter 
narcotics programs (White House Drug Policy, 1999).  
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Despite much rhetorical bravado and a few highly 
publicized successes, the United States effort has 
been a bitter disappointment.  There has been 
virtually no reduction in the aggregate amount of 
cocaine, heroin, and marijuana coming into the U.S. 
since President Reagans’s September 1981 anti-drug 
speech (UN commission on narcotics, 1968). 
According to John P. Walters, acting director of 
ONDCP, he testified that President Clinton has 
promoted policies that reversed or accelerated the 
reversal of nearly a decade of falling drug use.  
According to Walters, this “sea of change” in 
attitudes was undone by the Clinton Administration.  
He noted that the Clinton Administration is 
undermining existing anti-drug efforts on almost all 
fronts.  Walters pointed to the President’s 80 percent 
reduction in Office of National Drug Control Policy 
staff, the Attorney General’s stated goal of reducing 
minimum sentences for drug trafficking, and a 
presidential directive reducing Department of Defense 
support to drug interdiction efforts, the reduction in 
resources to border initiative programs, and a 
reduction in resources to transit and source countries 
by 33%.  Walters testified that the military and other 
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interdiction agencies have received a fifty percent 
force reduction in 1994, that has caused over fifty 
percent reduction in ability to stop drugs. 
LAW ENFORCEMENT SUCCESS’S 
In contrast to the prior research that has been 
suggested about the lack of law enforcement response 
to drug smuggling and the lack of commitment by the 
United States government in stopping drugs, I will 
present information which shows that no matter what 
commitment the US government has to stopping drugs, 
law enforcement is making a difference. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), and United States 
Customs Service (USCS) continually work side by side 
to help reduce the flow of narcotics into the United 
States.  Recently a two-year probe known as Operation 
Impunity focused on apprehending three alleged “cell 
heads” running the drug trafficking organization that 
remained after the death of Amado Carrillo Fuentes.  
Fuentes was considered Mexico’s No. 1 drug lord until 
he died in July 1997 while recovering from plastic 
surgery.  He was known as the “lord of the skies” 
because of his use of large aircraft to move drugs. 
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According to a written statement by Attorney 
General Janet Reno, “The impact of Operation Impunity 
is significant.  By targeting the cartel’s 
importation, transportation, and distribution network 
we have substantially hindered their ability to move 
cocaine and other drugs into and around this country.” 
Donnie Marshall, acting administrator of the DEA, said 
the operation was significant because it affected the 
operation from “top to bottom” affecting everything 
from transportation to distribution.  Ninety-three 
people were arrested in this crackdown on one of the 
largest drug cartels in Mexico.  Nearly twenty million 
in cash and seven million in other assets were seized 
during this two-year investigation. 
HIGH INTENSITY DRUG AREAS 
According to the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy pursuant to the Anti-Drug Act of 1988, High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA’s) are areas 
identified as having the most critical drug 
trafficking problems that adversely affect the United 
States.  The HIDTA program is a joint venture of 
local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies, 
which develop and implement joint, regional threat 
assessments and strategies to reduce drug trafficking.  
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The program institutionalizes teamwork through 
continuous joint planning and implementation, promotes 
equal partnership of local, state, and federal front-
line decision makers, invests in developing joint 
process and systems to integrate and synchronize 
efforts and has begun measuring collective outputs and 
outcomes.  California, Texas, and the Southwest border 
are just a few of the high intensity drug trafficking 
areas (DEA, 1999). 
The Southwest border HIDTA encompasses the entire 
2,000-mile border one to two counties deep divided 
into five regional partnerships of federal, state, and 
local enforcement agencies.  Each partnership has an 
executive committee, which oversees joint drug and 
money laundering task forces, regional intelligence 
centers ,and joint interdiction operations.  Some have 
and others are developing regional coordination 
centers.  In McAllen, Texas, a High Intensity Drug 
Area, agents and officers have reported great success 
by dismantling a multi-pound methamphetamine 
distribution organization by arresting its leader and 
seizing over 25 pounds of methamphetamine.  Other 
accomplishments include: dismantling of a multi-ton 
marijuana distribution organization, dismantling a 
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cell of the Gulf Cartel with the arrest of a manager 
and seizures of 337kg of cocaine, investigation of a 
cell of cocaine transportation organizations, and 
investigation of a multi ton international cocaine 
organizations in conjunction with regional DEA offices 
in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.  In fiscal year 
1997, seven major drug organizations in the South 
Texas HIDTA region were dismantled with 129 arrests, 
50 convictions, and forfeitures worth almost $600,000. 
UNITED STATES/MEXICO COOPERATION 
According to the U.S. Department of State, 
bilateral cooperation is helping to reduce narcotics 
production and trafficking.  The highest United States 
and Government of Mexico authorities on drug control 
gathered together frequently and permitted a thorough 
and systematic review of the full range of drug 
enforcement issues.  A meeting that took place in 
March established certain priorities and helped 
develop a relevant plan of action to deal with drug 
issues.  A meeting that took place in July outlined 
the basis for the joint strategy and reviewed progress 
on cooperative activities.  During the next meeting 
this group of individuals approved a bi-national 
threat assessment and reviewed progress on specific 
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action plans and goals for 1997 which will be used as 
the basis for a joint counter-narcotics strategy (US 
Department of State, 1997).  These groups continually 
met throughout the year to work on technical areas 
such as money laundering, demand reduction, and 
chemical control. 
Mexico has hosted many other high-level narcotics 
related working visits in 1996 from the US Secretary 
of State, Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and 
other high level government officials.  Government 
officials came to the United States to discuss drug 
enforcement issues.  In order to help the Mexicans 
understand US criminal law, the Government of Mexico 
and the United States Government sponsored a four week 
course on the subject for Mexican Judges, prosecutors, 
and law enforcement officials in Mexico City. 
  In May, DEA, FBI, and the US Customs Service 
signed an agreement with the Mexican Attorney Generals 
Office (PGR) on cooperation with, and support for, 
counter-drug task forces located in northern Mexico. 
These units are complemented by similar interagency 
task forces on the US side of the border set up under 
the US Department of Justice's Southwest Border 
Initiative.  In September, the PGR, the Secretary of 
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Treasury and Public Credit (Hacienda) signed letters 
of agreement allowing the US Embassy's Narcotics 
Affairs Section to provide direct support for law 
enforcement and eradication operations and money 
laundering investigations, respectively.  The United 
States government followed up on a 1995 lease of 12 
helicopters for the PGR's interdiction fleet with a 
transfer of spare parts and 12 decommissioned 
helicopters ("hulks").  The US Department of Defense 
also provided training slots for PGR pilot instructors 
and other key support personnel.  In all, the United 
States government provided training to nearly two 
hundred PGR and military personnel at US facilities 
(US Department of State, 1997). 
In years to come, Mexico and the United States 
have agreed to undertake activities to enhance 
cooperative efforts against drug abuse, trafficking, 
and production. The working groups of the High-Level 
Contact Group will soon begin to map out a specific 
strategy to meet this goal. The elements will include: 
strengthening institutional capacities of law 
enforcement agencies, maritime and air interdiction, 
control of illicit drug cultivation and production, 
training and equipment, combating criminal 
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organizations, and reducing demand for illicit drugs.  
The US government will increase technical and material 
assistance and training, particularly to specialized 
police and military units and to support money 
laundering investigations.  
While there has been progress by US federal law 
enforcement officials, both unilaterally by the 
Government of Mexico and bilaterally with the United 
States Government, the threat posed to both nations by 
criminal organizations based in Mexico is constant.  A 
substantially-greater level of effort and of bilateral 
coordination is required if the two governments are to 
have a significant impact on those organizations or 
their trans-border operations.  
        Mexico’s actions against the Juarez Cartel of Amado 
Carrillo Fuentes in early 1997 demonstrated that even 
determined law enforcement actions can be thwarted by 
cartel counter-intelligence capabilities.  Mexico’s 
arrests of a senior drug law enforcement officer, INCD 
Commissioner Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, on charges of 
collusion with the Carrillo Fuentes organization, 
further demonstrated the severity of the corruption 
problem.   
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This creates another obstacle for US law 
enforcement officials.  When the corruption in Mexico 
reaches the upper escholons of government, including 
the president and the Drug Czar of Mexico being on the 
payroll of drug traffickers, this causes more tension 
in an already untrusting relationship.  US law 
enforcement agents have responded to this situation by 
ceasing intelligence briefings with certain law 
enforcement factions of the Mexican anti-narcotics 
force.  
Despite the goodwill and determination of both 
governments, there are a number of obstacles and 
impediments which must still be addressed - not the 
least of which are corruption, sovereignty 
sensitivities, and differences in legal systems and 
investigative approaches -- but there are now new 
mechanisms for addressing them (US Department of 
State, 1997).  It is clear that 1997 was a watershed 
year for determining the course of the bilateral 
struggle against this threat of illicit narcotics.  
     In 1997, based on bilateral discussions, the 
United States will look for Mexico to make progress in 
achieving its objectives of:  
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- Tangible progress in dismantling major narcotics 
trafficking organizations, including arrest and 
prosecution of their leadership.  
- Strengthened investigative and prosecutorial 
capabilities, as demonstrated by adequate screening, 
training and financing of the bilateral task forces 
and organized crime prosecutors unit.  
- Publishing and enforcing regulations that require 
reporting of financial transactions involving large 
sums of currency and suspicious circumstances, and 
implementing the money laundering law passed in May 
1996.  
- Implementing an effective asset forfeiture program.  
- Implementing an effective control system on 
diversion of precursor and essential chemicals.  
- An enhanced extradition and expulsion relationship 
with the USG.  
- Expediting the mutual legal assistance treaty 
process, particularly with respect to telephone and 
bank records.  
- Investigating and prosecuting corruption at all 
levels of government.  
  
    Research Methods 
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The purpose of this research is to examine the 
responses of US federal law enforcement to the 
increased drug smuggling on the Southwest border.  
Information on this subject was obtained through many 
methods and sources.  I began researching the subject 
area by searching the internet sites of groups on both 
sides of the issue including, but not limited to US 
Department of State, General Accounting Office, and 
Office Of National Drug Strategy.  Searching through 
these different reports on drug enforcement I 
uncovered several major themes that I decided should 
be explored in my paper. 
  The literature review presented displays on both 
sides of the issue at hand.  That issue is whether law 
enforcement is effectively dealing with narcotics 
smuggling.  Discussed in the literature review were 
topics such as “High Intensity Drug Areas” and their 
effectiveness.  Also presented were some possible 
reasons why drug law enforcement techniques are 
currently ineffective. 
   Two interviews were conducted.  The first with 
Senior Inspector Van Brown of the United States 
Customs Service at the San Yisidro Border Crossing 
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area on the California/Mexico border.  The topics that 
were discussed pertained to inspection techniques and 
drug smuggling.  Also discussed were current programs 
underway and various other operations underway to 
thwart drug trafficking on the Southwest border.   
The second interview was with a DEA agent from the San 
Diego Filed Division in Southern California.  The 
topics discussed were DEA’s efforts in fighting drug 
smuggling at the border and their operations that are 
currently underway and the politics involved with this 
issue. 
   Information was drawn from various works written 
about my topic.  Several of these books are based on 
interviews with various undercover agents and what 
they see as the problem with drug enforcement 
policies. 
I have been unsuccessful in finding academic 
articles that deal with my topic directly.  I have 
found information dealing with various aspects of drug 
smuggling, but not what law enforcement is doing 
about.  The reason I am doing this professional paper 
is because there is not a lot of real significant 
academic information that can be found directly 
pertaining to my topic.   
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  In the following section the findings of my 
research will be discussed at length.  I will cover 
topics such as the Border Coordination Initiative, a 
program created by US Customs and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service.  Also, there will be 
discussion of the various campaigns by federal 
agencies to combat drug trafficking.  Militarization 
of the Southwest border is another issue that will be 
discussed at length. 
Findings 
(Law Enforcement Efforts) 
  In order to meet the challenge of policing the 
nation’s borders against drugs these agencies have had 
to work smarter by wedding new technologies with 
conventional investigative techniques and by 
prioritizing their functions.  For example, in the 
last fiscal year 3.5 million trucks, 75 million cars, 
and 254 million people crossed the border into the 
United States.  In contrast, the United States Customs 
service has only 1,800 inspectional personnel along 
the border (US Customs, 1999).   
The following topic that will be discussed is a 
joint federal law enforcement effort to curb border 
drug flow.  The North American Free Trade Agreement 
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(NAFTA) was an agreement in 1995 to open up our 
borders with Canada and Mexico to facilitate the flow 
of legitimate goods.  With this agreement the amount 
of drugs entering the country has also increased.  In 
response to NAFTA, US Customs started many 
initiatives.  
  The United States Customs Service started 
“Operation Hard Line” two years ago to permanently 
harden our nations Southwest border ports of entry 
from drug smugglers.  At the time, ports of entry 
along the U.S.-Mexico border were under siege of 
narcotics traffickers, known as port runners, who 
would brazenly speed drug-laden vehicles through 
border crossings jeopardizing the safety of our border 
officers and civilians.  Since the inception of 
“Operation Hard Line” port running has decreased 
almost 60%.  Drug seizures on the Southwest border 
increased substantially in fiscal year 1996.  
Narcotics seizures increased 29% by total number of 
incidents (6,956 seizures) and 24% by total weight 
(545,922 ponds of marijuana, 33,308 pounds of cocaine, 
and 459 pounds of heroin) when compared to fiscal year 
1995 totals.  Additionally, the total weight of 
narcotics seizures in commercial cargo on the U.S.-
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Mexico border in fiscal year 1996 were up over 153% 
due to the passage of NAFTA (56 seizures totaling 
39,741 pounds) when compared to FY 95 seizures 
statistics (US Customs, 1999).  This increase in 
narcotics seizures is due to intensified inspections 
and tactical intelligence resulting from “Operation 
Hard Line”.  
  The next issue that will be covered are topics 
relating to the “Border Coordination Initiative” (BCI) 
in response to increased smuggling on the Southwest 
border.  This is a comprehensive coordinated border 
management strategy between the U.S. Customs Service 
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
to increase cooperation among federal agencies on the 
Southwest border to more efficiently interdict drugs, 
illegal aliens, and other contraband.  The BCI is 
built on six core initiatives: 





6) Aviation and Marine 
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The Justice and Treasury Departments continue to 
work closely with the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy and other relevant agencies to implement the 
most effective and coherent approach to further combat 
the increasingly violent drug trade due to NAFTA while 
facilitating the legitimate flow of goods and people.  
A result of NAFTA is more drugs being hidden in 
shipments within the growing volume of goods exported 
from Mexico to the United States. This has become an 
increasingly favored method of smuggling cocaine.  
Cocaine traffickers have set up factories, warehouses, 
and trucking companies as fronts to move drugs into 
the United States under NAFTA. 
The result to this increase in trade is  that 70% 
percent of the cocaine entering the United States now 
arrives from Mexico as well as the majority of heroin 
and marijuana. (Drug Enforcement Administration, 
1999). 
As discussed earlier, the Border Coordination 
Initiative is built on six core initiatives to fight 
the influx of drugs do to increased smuggling 
increased by the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).  The first initiative is Port management, 
which are a joint enforcement, traffic management, and 
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community partnership plans at each of the 24 ports of 
entry.  This heightening of enforcement at the borders 
is the first step taken to help curb the drug flow.  
The second initiative is Investigations, which are 
unified strategies on all Southwest border seizures, 
controlled deliveries, and investigative and 
intelligence results to be used for targeting and 
inspection.  The third initiative is Intelligence, 
which is being enhanced to collect more data on drug 
interdiction, illegal aliens, and currency and 
document fraud.  The fourth initiative is Technology, 
utilization and sharing of technology resources and 
automated infrastructure.  Developmentation of a joint 
plan to capitalize on future technology is used to 
fight the drug trade.  The fifth initiative is 
Communications, which need to be revamped and replaced 
with interoperable, secure, mutually supportive, 
wireless communications system.  The six initiative 
are Aviation and Marine interdiction.    
Air Interdiction 
The United States Customs Service and the DEA 
have very large air interdiction programs.  Since the 
inception of NAFTA and the growing appetite in America 
for drugs, particularly cocaine, Customs has developed 
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an increasingly sophisticated armada of sensor 
equipped interceptor aircraft and apprehension 
helicopters to combat those attempting to smuggle 
narcotics across American borders (US Customs, 1999).  
Once detected, suspect aircraft entering U.S. air 
space are covertly intercepted, identified, and 
followed to their delivery sites by Customs 
interceptor aircraft such as the Cessna Citation jets 
and apprehended by aviation enforcement officers.  
Actions by smuggler aircraft are carefully videotaped 
and documented by Customs aircrews for use as evidence 
in subsequent criminal prosecution proceedings. 
Upon the creation of DEA in 1973, the aviation 
program consisted of 24 aircraft and 41 special 
agents/pilots.  The program continued to grow and in 
1994 the Aviation Section was granted field division 
status and renamed the Office of Aviation Operations 
(OA). The chief pilot was redesignated Special Agent 
in Charge and the two deputy chief pilots became 
assistant special agents in charge.  Today OA consist 
of 95 aircrafts and 117 special agents/pilots.  
Further evidence of the expansion and importance 
of the OA to the DEA's enforcement mission is the move 
to new facilities at Ft. Worth, Texas, Alliance 
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Airport in February  1994.   The new facility, known as 
the Aviation Operations Center, is the primary 
maintenance facility for the Office of Aviation fleet 
of aircraft and headquarters to OA's supervisory and 
administrative personnel, as well as contractor 
personnel (Drug Enforcement Administration, 1999).  
     The office of Aviation provides aviation support 
to domestic offices throughout the United States, High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, Special Enforcement 
Operations, Mobile Enforcement Teams, the Southwest 
Border Initiative, and the National Marijuana 
Eradication Strategy.  These operations consist of 
air-to-ground, air-to-water, air-to-air, electronic 
surveillance, and photographic reconnaissance.  
The United States Border patrol has responded to 
NAFTA by hiring hundreds of new agents, marine 
enforcement officers, and pilots.  The Border Patrol 
has several stations along the U.S.- Mexican border.  
A lot of the regions that are covered by the Border 
Patrol are very remote and very dangerous.  Agents 
have recently been assigned partners and armed with 
larger arsenol of weapons due to constant conflicts 
with heavily armed drug dealers in Eagle Pass, TX.  
The Border Patrol was at a disadvantage even before 
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their inception.  There are over two thousand miles of 
porous border areas that are conducive to drug 
smuggling and not nearly enough personnel to cover 
those areas. 
    Maritime Interdiction 
Maritime interdiction efforts have also increased 
to fight the drug flow.  The main agency that is our 
first line of defense is the Coast Guard which is the 
lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction. 
They share lead responsibility for air interdiction 
with the US Customs Service.  As such, they are a key 
player in combating the flow of illegal drugs to the 
United States.  
The Coast Guard's mission is to reduce the supply 
of drugs from the source by denying smugglers the use 
of air and maritime routes in the Transit Zone, a six 
million square mile area, including the Caribbean, 
Gulf of Mexico, and Eastern Pacific (United States 
Coast Guard, 1999).  In meeting the challenge of 
patrolling this vast area, the Coast Guard coordinates 
closely with other federal agencies and countries 
within the region to disrupt and deter the flow of 
illegal drugs.  In addition to deterrence, Coast Guard 
drug interdiction accounts for nearly 25% of all U.S. 
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government seizures of cocaine and marijuana each 
year.  For Fiscal Year 1997 the rate of Coast Guard 
cocaine seizures alone had an estimated street value 
of approximately $4 billion.  The Coast Guard has 
seized countless tons of marijuana and cocaine.  In 
fiscal year 1997 the Coast Guard seized 103,000 pounds 
of cocaine and 102,000 pounds of marijuana.  This 
agency has many marine support facilities all over the 
country.  There are maritime stations in Florida to 
help interdict Caribbean drug smuggling and maritime 
interdiction facilities along the Southwest border in 
Gulfport, Mississippi, San Diego, California, and 
Corpus Christi, Texas which house local, state, and 
federal vessels that are on call 24 hours a day to 
respond to maritime smuggling issues.  Many Coast 
Guard tactical law enforcement units are aboard navy 
ships so as to deploy to possible drug smuggling 
vessels in a timely manner anywhere in US waters.  
Maritime smuggling has rose 27% from 1996 to 1997 (Law 
Enforcement Today, 1996). 
                Smuggling Methods 
As law enforcement puts more resources into the 
drug war the dealers come back stronger and smarter.  
The problem with stopping the drug dealers is that 
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they have budgets larger than US law enforcement 
agencies combined.  Traffickers often hide drugs in 
shipments of food, such as fish or produce that would 
spoil if they were stopped and thoroughly searched.  
“Much of the time U.S. law enforcement officials are 
dealing with perishables, and unless there is specific 
information that drugs are in the load the priority is 
business and trade,” said a federal official, who like 
many others complained that NAFTA’s mandate of 
unfettered commerce hampers drug interdiction efforts. 
Other research suggest that drug dealers also 
ship small packages of drugs to the United States via 
express courier services or the regular mail small 
amounts at a time.  Customs and DEA officials say 
their greatest success comes from cases in which they 
have informants give specific information about drug 
shipments.  At the border crossings, officials say 
that their best weapon is a drug-sniffing dog, which 
can smell a single marijuana cigarette wrapped in 
plastic and hidden in a dashboard even through thick 
exhaust.  Traffickers have since gotten their own 
drug-sniffing dogs to evaluate their packaging 
methods. 
   Smuggling Countermeasures 
Southwest Border 30 
Authorities have tried to respond to the 
traffickers with countermeasures.  At many crossings, 
for example, concrete barriers have been erected to 
prevent cars and trucks from switching lanes, and to 
send them into a series of turns when leaving the 
gates to hinder port running.  The United States has 
hired an additional 5,300 inspectors and patrollers 
since 1992.  U.S. authorities have begun filming their 
surveyors with long-range lenses and recently spotted 
two Mexican police officers helping to coordinate lane 
shifts by a vehicle loaded with drugs (Washington 
Post, 1997).  Officials are also using a small gadget 
called a “buster” to measure the density of materials 
and a hand held laser that measures distances down to 
the fraction of an inch, both of which can help detect 
hidden compartments.  Some crossings are being 
equipped with giant X-ray machines to let agents 
inspect cargoes.  Most crossings have computers 
listing licenses of cars and trucks that have 
previously been used in illegal activities.  There is 
also another device in use by Customs called License 
Plate Readers.  These readers allow inspectors to 
accomplish their work without being distracted by 
entering license plate numbers into the automated law 
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enforcement system.  The first truck x-ray system 
continues to be successful at Otay Mesa, California.  
This prototype machine has contributed to the seizure 
of 17,765 pounds of drugs most of which were concealed 
in false compartments and other hiding places. 
A major problem with U.S. law enforcement 
officers is they are entrusted with defending the 
border and have been caught surrendering it to drug 
traffickers.  These federal, state, and local 
officials have been recruited by Mexican trafficking 
groups that for years have relied on corruption as 
their favored method for doing business south of the 
border.  They are offered huge bribes and profits and 
run little risk of getting caught.  Authorities have 
had their greatest successes in discovering corruption 
through sheer luck, leading them to conclude that much 
is going undetected (Washington Post, 1997).   
To fully understand the complexity of drug 
trafficking it needs to be understood that traffickers 
will go to any means necessary to transport their 
drugs into the United States.  Traffickers have been 
known to be very violent.  Killing individuals for the 
traffickers is a daily routine (Discovery Channel, 
1996).  Many innocent civilians and hundreds of drug 
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agents have died in the line of duty. According to one 
unnamed US official, he stated, “these traffickers are 
limited by their imagination,” and “money is no 
obstacle at all.” 
  In recent years drug trafficking organizations 
have bought 727-style planes and built a fleet of two 
man submarines to move drugs to the United States.  
They have secreted loads in propane tanks and 
containers of hazardous material, in small cans of 
tuna fish and five-gallon drums of jalapeno peppers.  
One trafficking group fashioned a special mold that 
was used to ship cocaine from Mexico through the 
United States and into Canada completely sealed inside 
the walls of porcelain toilets.  These groups are 
using satellite-linked navigation and positioning aids 
to coordinate airplane drops to boats waiting in the 
Caribbean and to trucks waiting in the Arizona and 
Texas deserts (Washington Post, 1997).   
  These Mexican drug groups also learned valuable 
lessons from their Italian Mafia and Colombian cartel 
counterparts on how to thwart law enforcement.  These 
Mexican groups usually are organized around family 
ties to prevent infiltration by informants and they 
are compartmentalized to protect the leaders to ensure 
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that if one cell of their group is dismantled, the 
entire business is not destroyed.   
In one such case a DEA agent by the name of 
Enrique Camarena infiltrated the organization of drug 
king pin Miguel Carro Quintero.  Camarena discovered a 
field of marijuana so huge it was nicknamed “buffalo” 
and had it destroyed.  The estimated value of the 
marijuana destroyed was 200 million dollars.  Shortly 
afterward Agent Camarena was kidnapped in broad 
daylight near the US embassy in Guadalajara Mexico by 
the Mexican Police he was working with.  DEA started a 
manhunt for Camarena and his body was found one month 
later, clad only in underwear and severely beaten.  
Agent Camarena’s informant was also found buried in 
the same hole and showed signs of have been buried 
alive.  According to the DEA the Mexican Federal 
Police dragged their feet in searching for the 
killers.  The DEA also reported that the house 
Camarena was tortured in was stripped and cleaned the 
day after by Mexican Federal police.  Some of 
Camarena’s killers have still not been brought to 
justice and others are in jail in Mexico on un-related 
charges. 
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  Hope has been restored to law enforcement because 
on Wednesday, September 16th 1998 the House Of  
Representatives turned aside Clinton administration 
objections and overwhelmingly passed a 3.2 billion 
bill to bolster the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, 
and Latin America governments in their struggle to 
stop drugs from reaching our country’s borders.  White 
house drug czar Barry R. McCaffrey testified in the 
Senate that a similar measure awaiting action would be 
too expensive and would represent micro-management of 
drug tactics based on a shallow analysis of the 
problem and our available tools.   In the House,  
Republican leaders insisted they were boosting the 
budget for drug interdiction because they believe that 
President Clinton had failed to stem the flow of drugs 
into the US (Los Angeles Times, 1996). 
INTERVIEWS WITH US DRUG OFFICIALS 
A phone interview was conducted with Senior 
Inspector Van Brown of the United States Customs 
Service.  Mr. Brown was very insightful and helpful in 
trying to explain the dynamics of drug smuggling.  
Inspector Brown oversees numerous inspectors at the 
San Yisidro border station right outside San Diego, 
California.  I asked Inspector Brown many questions 
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relating to border interdiction efforts.  Mr. Brown 
explained that Customs deals with 47,000 vehicles a 
day crossing through this border station.  It was 
explained to me that inspectors are highly trained 
observers and are pretty good at being able to tell 
who is lying to them and who is not.  Inspector Brown 
explained that people who are smuggling drugs usually 
have physiological responses which are tell tale ways 
to a law enforcement official that they have something 
to hide.  Many of these inspectors rely on their  
hunches and years experience to find narcotics on a 
vehicle or a person.                                                                                                                                                
Inspector Brown also conveyed to me that all vehicles 
crossing the border are subject to inspection and 
every vehicle cannot be possibly searched.  This would 
be futile because there is not nearly enough time or 
personnel.   
US Customs inspectors are the front runners on 
border interdiction relating to vehicles.  All of the 
leg work of finding the drugs is done at the border by 
inspectors.  There is a common misconception that the 
“Special Agents” do all the work, this is untrue.  
Agents make the arrests after the inspectors discover 
the drugs and from there they take the defendant 
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through the legal process and continue to investigate 
this incident for further leads about other drug 
smuggling operations.  Inspectors are using a new 
optical device to see into small crevices in vehicles 
that could be hiding illegal drugs.  Inspector Brown 
would not comment any further on this device or any 
other devices used for drug detection.  Inspector 
Brown did say that drug smuggling is only limited by 
the smugglers imagination.  There is no longer a drug 
courier profile.  He said, “the least suspecting 
people smuggle drugs.  Women often smuggle drugs in 
their children’s baby carriages and on the children 
themselves.” 
  Another interview was conducted with an agent 
from the San Diego field division office of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration.  The agent I interviewed 
would not give me his name and wanted to remain 
anonymous.  I had prepared a series of questions for 
this agent, but only had the opportunity to ask two of 
them.  The first question asked was, “Are you 
effectively enforcing the Southwest border against 
drug smuggling?”  This agent answered me and said, 
“Why don’t you ask the fucking president, he has tied 
our hands in our efforts to stop the drug flow.”  The 
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agent continued to say that President Clinton handles 
Mexico with white gloves.  I also asked him why 
cocaine in 1985 cost anywhere from $30,000 to $40,000 
a kilo and it can now be bought for twelve to fifteen 
thousand dollars a kilo.  I was under the assumption 
and still believe the reason in this price difference 
is that there is now a plethora of cocaine on the 
market and it does not demand the same price because 
of the amount currently available.  This agent had a 
different view point.  He stated the reason cocaine 
prices were down was because cocaine is no longer in 
high demand like it was in the 1980’s and 
methamphetamine  is now the drug of choice which is 
why prices have dropped considerably. 
  The Drug Enforcement Administration is the lead 
federal agency for the enforcement of narcotics and 
controlled substance laws and regulations.  The DEA’s 
priority mission is the long term immobilization of 
major drug trafficking organizations through the 
apprehension of their leaders, termination of their 
trafficking networks, and seizure of their assets 
(White House Drug Policy, 1999).    
The Drug Enforcement Administration supports the 
Federal Drug control priorities through its programs 
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that reduce domestic drug-related crime and violence, 
reduce the domestic illegal drug production and 
availability, and prosecution of those that illegally 
manufacture, traffic in, and distribute illegal drugs 
in the United States. 
  DEA also has been increasingly involved in the 
Southwest Border Initiative and contributes to the 
Department of Justice’s comprehensive interagency 
strategy against drug trafficking in the region.  This 
program is an integrated, coordinated law enforcement 
effort designed to attack the command and control 
structure of organized criminal enterprise operations 
associated with the Mexican federation.  According to 
Thomas Constanine, ex-Director of the DEA, Mexican 
organized crime syndicates share a loose consortium of 
major trafficking organizations with well-established 
organized crime credentials that compose the Mexican 
Federation.  Four organizations comprise the Mexican 
crime groups: the Tijuana organization, the Sonora 
cartel, the Juarez cartel, and the Gulf group. 
MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS 
These following organizations were described in 
detail by Thomas Constantine to the US Senate in 1996.  
An excerpt will be provided.  The Tijuana organization 
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is headed by the Arellano Felix brothers, Benjamin, 
Francisco and Ramon, and is headquartered in Tijuana 
and Baja California.  This group controls smuggling 
across the border to California and is among the most 
violent of the Mexican organizations and has been 
connected by Mexican officials to the violent death of 
Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas-Ocampo who was killed in 
the cross fire of rivals drug gangs at the Guadalajara 
Airport in 1993.  During 1994, this group was engaged 
in a turf battle over methamphetamine territory in San 
Diego. Twenty-six homicides were committed during one 
summer as rival groups battled over trafficking 
regions.  Benjamin Arellano Felix was indicted on May 
2, 1989 in San Diego on charges of operating a 
continuing criminal enterprise which involved the 
importation and distribution of cocaine. Arellano 
Felix is frequently seen in Mexico and has never been 
arrested on these charges.  Francisco Rafael Arellano 
Felix, his brother, was indicted in San Diego in 1980 
for possession and conspiracy to possess cocaine.  He 
too, has not been arrested.  
The Sonora cartel is headed by Miguel Caro 
Quintero and operates out of Hermosillo, Agua Prieta, 
Guadalajara and Culican, as well as the Mexican states 
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of San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa and Sonora.  Rafael, 
Miguel's brother, is in jail for his role in the 
killing of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camerena in 1985.  
The Sonora cartel has direct links to the Colombian 
cartel and operates routes into California, Arizona, 
Texas and Nevada.  Miguel Caro Quintero was indicted 
in Arizona for shipping two tons of cocaine from 
Mexico to Arizona, and has been indicted twice in 
Colorado.  He continues to be a fugitive, but claims 
publicly to travel freely in various areas of Mexico.  
The Juarez cartel is headed by Amado Carillo 
Fuentes, the most powerful figure in the Mexican drug 
trade.  His organization is linked to the Rodriquez 
Orejuela organization in Cali, Colombia and has family 
ties to the Ochoa brothers in Medellin, Colombia.  For 
many years, this organization ran transportation 
services for the Cali cartel, and used aircraft 
including 727's to fly cocaine from Colombia to 
Mexico.  He also used to move drugs from regional 
bases in Guadalajara, Hermosillo, and Torreon. Carillo 
Fuentes has been indicted in Dallas and Miami and has 
also been a fugitive for eight years until his recent 
death after undergoing plastic surgery to alter his 
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looks.  Amado Carrillo Fuentes was in the process of 
moving his headquarters to Argentina. 
The Gulf group was headed by Juan Garcia Abrego 
and is based in Matamoros, Tamaulipas State.  It 
distributes cocaine into the United States as far 
north as Michigan, New Jersey and New York.  DEA has 
reports that this organization smuggled in excess of 
30 tons of cocaine into the United States.  Humberto 
Garcia Abrego, Juan's brother, was arrested in October 
1994 by Mexican authorities.  Juan Garcia Abrego, one 
of the FBI's Ten Most Wanted, was  arrested on January 
14, 1996.  After his arrest Mexican officials worked 
quickly to expel Abrego to the United States to face 
charges of conspiracy to import cocaine and the 
Due to increased law 
enforcement in Southern 
California border regions, 
smugglers have  moved 
operations to more desolate 
areas such Eagle Pass Texas  
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management of a continuing criminal enterprise, 
however his organization continues to operate in spite 
of Abrego's arrest. 
     
 
Within the last year, several top law enforcement 
officials from Tijuana have been assassinated.  These 
killings are indicative of the impunity with which the 
Mexican crime syndicates feel they can operate and are 
consistent with the intimidation and narco-terrorist 
methods of the Cali and Medellin cartels.  The capture 
of these powerful drug traffickers and the dismantling 
of their organizations operating on both sides of the 
border are top priorities of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration. 
DEA, in cooperation with Federal, State and local 
law enforcement agencies, is focusing increased 
intelligence, technical resources and investigative 
expertise on the major Mexican drug trafficking 
operations responsible for smuggling vast quantities 
of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine 
across the Southwest border into the United States.  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration also provide operational 
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planning, intelligence, and training to the Government 
of Mexico law enforcement authorities to strengthen 
their capacity to collect drug intelligence, attack 
production capability, conduct transshipment 
interdiction, investigations, and asset seizures and 
prosecute key traffickers. 
 
Asset Forfeiture 
All federal agencies especially the DEA and FBI 
use asset forfeiture to their advantage to ensure that 
criminals do not benefit financially from their 
illegal acts.  Federal law provides that profits from 
drug-related crimes, as well as property used to 
facilitate certain crimes, are subject to forfeiture 
to the government.  Since drug trafficking is a crime 
of greed, asset forfeiture is an effective weapon 
because it removes the profit from such illegal 
activities.  Asset forfeiture can also financially 
disable drug-trafficking organizations.  International 
drug traffickers use their wealth to purchase the very 
best state-of-the-art weaponry and communications 
equipment. Seizure of the drug profits prevents them 
from possessing such advanced equipment and makes it 
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more difficult for them to thwart law enforcement 
efforts (DEA, 1999).  
Not only are the profits of crime taken away from 
criminals through asset forfeiture, but the money is 
put into the Asset Forfeiture Fund, which is used to 
help crime victims and to fund law enforcement 
programs that further combat crime. For example, in 
Philadelphia, two federally forfeited properties that 
had been used as "stash" houses for drug organizations 
were recently transferred to an organization called 
United Neighbors Against Drugs.  The properties now 
serve as a community center for drug abuse 
prevention, job skills training programs, and safe 
haven educational programs for neighborhood children.  
     Asset forfeiture has been a part of American 
jurisprudence since the founding of the nation.  To 
protect citizens from the abuse of this power, federal 
civil forfeiture laws contain numerous protections.  
No property may be seized unless the government meets 
the standard of "probable cause" - the same standard 
of proof required to arrest a person or secure a 
warrant to search a person's home.  Property is seized 
by the DEA only when it is determined to be a tool 
for, or the proceeds of, illegal activities such as 
Southwest Border 45 
drug trafficking, organized crime, or money 
laundering.  
  The Southwest border strategy also targets 
Mexican trafficking organizations operating across the 
border and attacks their command and control 
infrastructures wherever they operate.  The efforts of 
DEA produced some good results in FY 1996.  They had 
4,342 cases and 5,282 arrests, confisicated (7,711 
kg): heroin (51kg), marijuana (250,433 kg), 
methampaetamine (264 kg).  DEA seized 136 clandestine 
lab seizures and had 227 narcotics Title III 
intercepts (DEA 1999).  Title III intercepts which are 
federally regulated guidelines that pertain to legal 
eavesdropping in all states.  Previous to this 
regulation investigators could listen to everything 
that came over the wire or the bug.  This regulation 
put limits on what and what you cannot listen too 
(Franceschini, 1993). 
Military and Drug Enforcement 
(Exercise in Futility) 
Since the mid 1980s, the use of the United States 
armed forces in the "war on drugs" has been a topic of 
much debate.  The term 'war' is evoked and ambitious 
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objectives declared, justifying the participation on 
an increasing level of armed forces in counter-drug 
operations both domestically and internationally 
(DRCNET, 1999). 
Too many Americans, frustrated by the apparent 
lack of progress in the control of the illegal drug 
trade, feel the use of the armed forces seems a 
logical step.  The military drug warriors bring 
additional manpower, resources, and experience to the 
struggle against drugs.  Despite the commitment of the 
armed forces, however, the United States is no closer 
to its goal of being "drug free" today than it was a 
decade ago.  As will be seen the stated objectives, 
with their contingent use of the armed forces, has had 
no basis in viable military strategy.  The end result 
has been a drug war which has been not only 
demonstrably a failure but has proven 
counterproductive to the interests of America's 
national security and liberties.  
The U.S. government's stated objectives in the 
war on drugs can be summarized as follows:  
MILITARY OBJECTIVES 
• Eradication of drug crops  
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• Interdiction of drug smuggling  
• Investigation and prosecution of drug traffickers  
• Reduction of demand by increased penalization of 
users  
In accomplishing these objectives, the United 
States has seen a gradual insertion of its armed 
forces into drug enforcement since the 1980’s.  For 
example the National Defense Act of 1989 gives the 
Department of Defense responsibility for certain 
aspects of drug enforcement, including command-
control-communications-intelligence, detection, and 
monitoring.  This act also authorizes the National 
Guard to get involved with drug enforcement matters as 
well.  Title 10 US Code, chapter 18, gives guidance 
for the use of the armed forces in law enforcement 
(DRCNET, 1999).  The armed forces are prohibited from 
making direct search, seizures, and arrests, unless 
authorized by written law. 
  Joint Counter-drug operations states that the 
Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids the use of the 
military for civilian law enforcement, does not apply 
to the National Guard in state service.  There is much 
controversy over this matter of “state service” 
because drug enforcement maybe a federal mission, and 
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that federal funds are used to support the national 
guard. 
  The ability for military to take action in drug 
enforcement issues comes from Title 32 US code, which 
effectively frees the armed forces from some of the 
constraints of the “Posse Comitatus Act”.  As stated 
earlier the military supports law enforcement and 
participates in everything except search, seizure, 
arrest.  Some of the missions of the military include, 
• Intelligence support: provision of linguists for 
translations; conduct of intelligence analysis; 
analysis of data.  
• Communications: provision of equipment and 
support.  
• Logistics: provision of transport, helicopters 
and other aircraft; supply, maintenance, etc.  
• Cargo and mail inspection at points of entry into 
the United States (which are generally not 
covered by Constitutional restrictions on search 
and seizure).  
• Training of law enforcement personnel in military 
skills related to drug enforcement.  
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• Reconnaissance: including aerial observation, 
sensors and ground surveillance.  
These objectives appear to be sound but they are 
not attainable.  The United States Department of 
Defense has performed analysis of the military force 
it would take to secure U.S. borders against drug 
trafficking to complete the mission of interdicting 
drugs.  This analysis was reported to the Narcotics 
control Strategy Report.  The needed amount of 
personnel and supplies area as follows: 
• 96 infantry battalions 
• 53 helicopter companies 
• 210 patrol ships 
• 110 surveillance aircraft 
An infantry battalion is equivalent to five 
hundred to a thousand men.  In order for a battalion 
to function in the field, it requires several levels 
of support from intelligence to logistics units.  The 
same is similar with the helicopter companies.  
According to this study the end result would be that a 
force of 500,000 or so personnel would be needed to 
function in the field.  Again according to this report 
anything less than the stated amount of personnel 
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would be a waste of resources in as much as drug 
traffickers would exploit any gaps in the border 
defenses. 
    Conclusion 
The response of law enforcement to the increasing 
drug trade has been enormous.  The question that needs 
to be answered is, “Are these agencies effectively 
curbing the flow of drugs?”  The scope of this paper 
and the information obtained is limited because of 
many factors.  The first factor is that law 
enforcement agencies reports and current operations 
underway are highly classified material which cannot 
be disclosed to civilians and even certain agency 
personnel.  These law enforcement agencies operate on 
the military principle of the “need to know basis,” 
and I as a civilian during the course of my research 
called many different law enforcement agencies for 
information.  
I asked about arrest figures, wiretap figures, 
and seizures.  I was given some statistics but the 
majority were from 1996 and prior.  The current 
statistics have not been de-classified and I was told 
many times that if these recent figure were divulged 
operation’s could be jeopardized.  That did not seem 
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like a legitimate excuse but that was the answer I was 
given. 
The second limitation to research was that a lot 
of information came from the agencies themselves.  
According to all these law enforcement agencies they 
are very successful at stopping drugs but as we know 
drugs are readily available any where in the country.  
These agencies showed a positive bias towards their 
own success. I could not use this information alone to 
come to a conclusion because the results of my 
research would be one sided. 
Throughout my research I have found almost no 
academic research on this topic.  Everything I have 
found pertains to drug smuggling on the Southwest 
border, but does not pertain to what law enforcement 
is doing about it.  Due to this problem information 
was hard to come by so I conducted two interviews with 
different federal agencies to get some insight from 
field agents to what exactly is going on. 
Throughout my research the constant theme of the 
“war on drugs” plagued my conscious.  I asked myself 
is there truly a war underway or was this phrase 
merely window dressing created by the media and the 
government to create hype about the drug problem to 
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let the American people think that their tax dollars 
are hard at work fighting drug king pins in Mexico.  I 
keep reminiscing about when President Reagan told 
America that we’ve turned the corner in the war on 
drugs. 
Another important issue to take into 
consideration is the fact that Mexico relies on the 
drug trade to support its economy.  If there were 
truly a war on drugs and funding was taken away from 
Mexico and the borders shut down Mexico would collapse 
economically.  I came across numerous articles citing 
that there are entire cities and villages in Mexico 
whose entire populations work centers around the 
cultivation of marijuana and other drugs.  If those 
drug plantations were destroyed, hundreds and 
thousands of people would cease to have an income and 
this would lead to increased crime and impoverish an 
already poverty stricken country.  According to these 
articles the individuals that refuse to cultivate the 
drugs are murdered. 
The threat of violence, extortion, and bribery 
are the reasons the drug trade continues to flourish 
in Mexico.  These factors associated with drug 
smuggling pour over our borders into the United States 
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and put American lives at risk and threaten the 
National Sovereignty and security of our nation. 
I have viewed many programs where American News 
crews will go to Mexico and accompany Mexican military 
and police on “search and destroy” missions for 
narcotics.  I truly believe that these situations are 
manipulated by the Mexican government and these 
controlled burns and destruction of these so called 
drug fields are staged for media purposes trying to 
show the United States that Mexico is committed to 
ridding its country of illegal drugs.  What people 
need to understand is the level of collusion that 
exists between traffickers and law enforcement.  As I 
stated earlier, there has been many documented cases 
of police and military unloading narcotics for drug 
dealers and protecting them while in uniform and on 
duty. 
   I continue to question if the United States is 
really committed to stopping drug trafficking.  The 
answer to this question would have to be no.  If the 
US was committed to stop drug trafficking Mexico would 
have to be de-certified under NAFTA as a country 
committed to stopping drugs.  Offshore bank accounts 
would have to be made illegal for US citizens to have, 
Southwest Border 54 
and a multitude of other policy changes would have to 
be in order to cut down on the flow of narcotics. 
There is a delicate balance between politics and 
drug enforcement and this needs to be understood.  
These two policies conflict with each other and that 
needs to be dealt with.  Two years ago I had the 
opportunity to meet the Special Agent in Charge Of the 
US Customs New York field division.  I asked this 
individual about the problems that NAFTA has created 
and he said to me, “Evan you have to ask yourself 
which is more important trade or enforcement?”  I said 
enforcement and he followed up on that comment by 
telling me that trade is more important than 
enforcement. He stated that trade was 80% important 
and enforcement was the remaining 20%.   
I have come to the conclusion that law 
enforcement agencies give their best effort into 
combating drug trafficking with the amount of 
resources they have available to them presently.  
These law enforcement officers and agencies have been 
somewhat effective in controlling the drug problem.  
They have made a small dent in the organizations that 
transport these drugs into the United States.  Without 
these agencies the country would be a violent place to 
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live. The lack of resources such as manpower and money 
are the limiting factors when dealing with this issue. 
The other problem faced by American agents is 
that the bi-lateral coordination efforts are hampered 
between American Federal agents and Mexican Police 
because of the known collusion of the Mexican Police 
and traffickers.   
The biggest problem that United States law 
enforcement officers face is often what Customs and 
DEA believe is a new trafficking trend is in fact 
months old.  By the time it has been detected the drug 
dealers have moved on to a new technique. 
  More research needs to be done on this subject to 
try to get a grasp on the issues that law enforcement 
faces on a day to day basis.  Some possible future 
studies in this subject field might be able to coax US 
policy makers into putting more resources into drug 
programs and enforcement and coming up with new 
strategies to help rid our country of drugs.  The 
problem of drugs took a long time to develop and it 
will take an even longer time to cure.  In closing, as 
Tom Cash (personal communication, August 23, 1999), 
the ex-DEA Special Agent in charge of Miami, said 
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about US enforcement efforts, “You can do something or 
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